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SPECIAL PLEAS OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES BY DEFENDANT IN
CRIMINAL CASES
Civil pleading at common law labored in almost metaphysical
detail to narrow issues of both law and fact. But perhaps as
an echo of the severity of criminal justice,' the pleadings of a
defendant in a criminal trial were so constructed as to give him
wide latitude in defense, through the means of a single simple
plea. Under the plea of not guilty he could, and in most states
'See MINNESOTA CRIME COMMISSION REPORT (1927) 28.
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now still can, and must,2 raise such issues as insanity,3 alibi,"
self-defense,s intoxication,6 and the statute of limitations.r At
common law he was, however, forced to plead autrefois acquit
and convict specially in bar,8 and today eleven jurisdictions have
expressly incorporated this practice into their statutes?. In one
case such a statute was interpreted to allow the defense of
former jeopardy under a plea of not guilt,', a result which can-
not arise in the seven states which have an additional, inclusive 2
plea of former jeopardy. - The states which have no statute on
the subject almost uniformly perpetuate the common-law prac-
tice by judicial decision, 3 but an exception has been made when
all the facts are of record and may be judicially noticed."- The
2 Special pleas of matter which might come in under not guilty are
properly disallowed. State v. Karagavoorian, 32 R. I. 477, 79 Atl. 1111
(1911); Stacks v. State, 20 Ala. App. 462, 103 So. 70 (1925).
3 State v. Speyer, 207 Mo. .540, 106 S. W. 505 (1907) ; Johnson v. State,
57 Fla. 18, 49 So. 40 (1909).
4 See Allbritton v. State, 94 Ala. 76, 77, 10 So. 426 (1892).
s State v. Linden, 154 La. 65, 97 So. 299 (1923).
6 People v. Collins, 30 Cal. App. 656, 1.59 Pac. 229 (1916).
7 James v. State, 110 Ark. 170, 160 S. W. 1090 (1913) ; People v. Bailey,
103 Misc. 366, 171 N. Y. Supp. 394 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
' 2 BisHoP, NEW CRIMINaL PRoCEDuRE (1913) § 806.
9 ALASKA Com. LAWS (1913) § 2208; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford &
Moses, 1921) § 3074; IOWA CODE (1927) § 13799; KY. CrnM. CODE: (Carroll,
1927) § 172; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10695; N. Y. CaIM. CODE (Ben-
der, 1928) § 332; OHIO CRIM. CODE (Patterson, 1924) § 13447; OZLTA COMIP.
STAT. ANN. (1921) § 2617; ORE. LAWS (Olson, 1920) § 1500; S. D. REV.
CODE (1919) § 4780; WASH. ComP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 2108.
'
0 People v. Cage, 48 Cal. 323 (1874).
The plea of former jeopardy may include autrefois acquit and convict.
:See State v. Keerl, 33 Mont. 501, 515, 35 Pac. 862, 865 (1906).
12 A =. PEN. CODE (1913) § 989; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1923) §
1016; IDAHO ConP. STAT. (1919) § 8879; MON-r. REV. CODES (Choate, 1921)
§ 119fG7; NEV. REv. LAWs (1912) § 7106; N. D. CoM.tP. LA ws ANN. (1913) §
10746; UTAH CoiMP. LAws (1917) § 8898.
23 Territory v. Labato, 17 N. M. 666, 134 Pac. 222 (1913), affd cub. nom.
Lovato v. State, 242 U. S. 199, 37 Sup. Ct. 107 (1916), L. R. A. 1917A
1233. The purpose of this type of plea has been indicated as notice to the
opposing side. See State v. Johnson, 11 Nev. 273, 276 (1876); State v.
Reilly, 94 Conn. 698, 703, 110 Atl. 550, 552 (1920) (notice by state; in-
creased penalties for repeated offense). But see Davis v. State, 152 Ind.
145, 148, 52 N. E. 754, 755 (1899), perhaps explained by IND. .4-N. STAT.
(Burns, 1926) § 2230.
'1 State v. White, 71 Kan. 356, 80 Pac. 589 (1905) ; People v. Taylor, 117
Mich. 583, 76 N. W. 158 (1898); Riggs v. State, 96 S. W. 25 (Tex. Cr.
App. 1906) ; Belter v. State, 178 Wis. 57, 189 N. W. 270 (1922) ; see George
v. State, 59 Neb. 163, 168, 80 N. W. 486, 487 (1899); Jackson v. State, 11
Okla. Cr. 523, 527, 148 Pac. 1058, 1060 (1915). But former jeopardy must
be raised by special plea when the indictment is not the same though in the
same court and before the same judge. People v. Bennett, 114 Cal. 56,
45 Pac. 1013 (1896); see State v. Cross, 44 W. Va. 315, 319, 29 S. E. 527,
528 (1898).
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special plea is tried separately in advance of the issue of not
guilty15, and will not alone survive the withdrawal of a plea of
not guilty in favor of a plea of guilty.G Only four states defi-
nitely allow the defense of former jeopardy under a plea of not
guiltyy The other common-law special plea, that of pardon,",
has survived in statute ' 9 and case 20 law, and a special plea may
be necessary to set up an immunity from prosecution.21 These
'were the compulsory special pleas,22 and while the defendant was
at liberty to plead the statute of limitations specially, this course
was merely optional with him.23
The'function of compulsory special pleading of affirmative de-
fenses may be to narrow the issues by exclusion of all save those
pleaded; to give notice of the defense to be relied on, and per-
haps, incidentally, to separate the issues for the consideration of
the jury. On the theory of notice, special pleas amounting to an
outline of defense have been urged,24 as a method of more nearly
equalizing the position of the state and the defendant .2  Fur-
15 See United States v. Hopkins & Co., 228 Fed. 173, 175 (S. D. N. V.
1912) ; Parsons v. State, 179 Ala. 23, 24, 60 So. 864, 865 (1913).
16 People v. Strickler, 167 Cal. 627, 140 Pac. 270 (1914).
1 People v. Hawkinson, 324 Ill. 285, 155 N. E. 318 (1927); Barker v.
State, 188 Ind. 263, 120 N. E. 593 (1918) ; State v. Salter, 256 S. W. 1070
'(Mo. App. 1923) (under a broad not guilty plea); State v. Conlin, 27 Vt.
,S18 (1855); and perhaps Morrisey v. People, 11 Mich. 327 (1863).
f- 1:8 CrAIEK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1918) § 139.
19 NnB. ComP. STAT. (1922) § 10118; Onio CRm. CODE (Patterson, 1924)
§ 13630; Wyo. CoMp. STAT. ANN. (1920) § 7492.
20 See Michael v. State, 40 Ala. 361, 370 (1867); United States v.
Schreck, 6 Alaska 412, 418 (1921); State v. Blalock, 61 N. C. 242, 247
(1867). Conttra: Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S. W. 735
(1901). It may be pleaded at any time. See Territory v. Richardson, 9
-'Okla. 579, 590, 60 Pac. 244, 247 (1900). And perhaps it may be raised on
,tntion. See United States v. Wilson, 32 U. S. 150, 163 (1833).
21 Scribner v. State, 90 Okla. Cr. 465, 132 Pac. 933 (1913) ; State v. Sine,
91 W. Va. 608, 114 S. E. 150 (1922).
22 Another might be added in a plea of non-identity in escape. See Thomas
v. State, 6 Miss. 20, 31 (1840).
23 2 BisHop, op. cit.' supra note 8, § 799 (5). Some cases seem to require -
a special plea. People v. Murphy, 296 Ill. 532, 129 N. E. 868 (1921); see
State v. McIntire, 58 Iowa 572, 573, 12 N. W. 593 (1882); Commonwealth
v. Ruffner, 28 Pa.'259, 260 (1857); cf. State v. Thrasher, 79 le. 17, 7
Atl. 814 (1887) (cannot be raised on motion in arrest of judgment). Others
refuse to allow it at all. State v. Johnson, 217 N. W. 205 (S. D. 1927) ; of.
'United States v. Barber, 219 U. S. 72, 31 Sup. Ct. 209 (1911) (result from
statute on continifing conspiracy). The special plea does not, warrant a
separate preliminary trial of the issue. State v. Snyder, 182 Mo. 462, 82
S. W.'12 (1904).- I .
24 See Millar, The Function of Criminal Pleading (1922) 12 J. Cim, L.
500, 503; Freeman, Should the Defendant in a Criminal Case File a Written
Pleding Outlining'His Defense? - (1924) 8 MilN. L: R V. 357.25 Accordingly in those stAtes where the posecution must furnish the
defendant with a list of its witnesses, the defendant is to reciprocate wilth
a list of his witnesses. Millar, op. cit. supra note 24, at 504. This has been
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thermore, it seems that the plan would have the merit of saving
the state the unnecessary expense of preparation for undisputed
issues.
It is obvious that any breaking up of the inclusive plea of not
guilty must come through statutory change. In the past only one
jurisdiction has been at all thorough in the process: In Scotland
it is not "competent for the person accused to state any special
defense unless a plea of special defense shall be tendered and
recorded.. ." 2c6 and under the Scotch statute there must be pleas
for alibi, insanity and self-defense.27 This seems admirably to
fulfill the purpose of notice to the prosecution. The defense must
be outlined, and the requirement in the statutory section that the
defendant furnish the prosecution a list of his witnesses, and
in certain cases what they are to prove,2 practically confines
his case to the issues pleaded. In this way the issues might be
said to be narrowed, but not exactly by the same process of
exclusion as that of the common-law "rule" against duplicity of
pleading in criminal cases,2 which, incidentally, has caused some
courts trouble in connection with special defenses. 0 The Scotch
statute leaves untouched the question of separation of issues for
the jury.
Legislation in this country has stopped far short of the range
of the Scotch statute. No provisions for special pleas of self-
defense, alibi, or the statute of limitations have been found.
There is, however a requirement of a special plea of the defense
of insanity in seven states; 3 three more have express provision
for a special plea optional with the defendant; 32 and in at least
done. Wash. Laws 1925, 420, § 2, amending WASH. Corip. STAT. (Reming-
ton, 1922) § 2050; 50 & 51 Vicr. c. 29, § 36 (1887). While this might
jeopardize a defendant by subjecting his witnesses to popular disfavor and
intimidation before trial, it would seem to do no more than to balance the
situation which now exists where the state alone must furnish to the defend-
ant a list of its witnesses.
26 50 & 51 Vic. c. 29, § 36 (1887).
27 RENTON & BROwN, CRIMINAL PROcEDnE ACCORDING TO TIE LAY., OF
ScoTLAND (1909) 73.
28 Ibid. 319.
29 2 BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 8, § 748.
2o Special pleas have not been allowed with a plea of not guilty. Rex v.
Banks, [1911J 2 K. B. 1095, Ann. Cas. 1912A 439; See State v. Ward, 49
Conn. 429, 436 (1881).
OlALA. CRIM. CODE (1923) § 4572; Cal. Laws 1927, c. 677; Colo. Laws
1927, c. 90, §§ 1, 2, 3; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 2230; Ohio Laws
1927, § 13608; WASH. Comp. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 2174; Wis. STAT.
(1927) c. 357, § 11.
NEB. COMnP. STAT. (1922) § 10164; N. H. Laws 1926, c. 369, § 2; N. Y.
CODE Cmi. PROc. (Gilbert, 1928) § 336. In New York evidence of insanity
may be received without the special plea. People v. Joyce, 233 N. Y. 61,
134 N. E. 836 (1922). GA. PEN. CODE (1926) § 976 would appear to allow
a special plea of insanity at the time of the offence, but such plea has been
stricken without error. Alford v. State, 137 Ga. 458, 73 S. E. 375 (1911).
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one other state it is probable that such a special plea would not
be :stricken.3 3 This is the extent of legislative action.3 4
While the statutes requiring the compulsory plea of insanity
are quite dissimilar, they have certain homogeneous characteris-
tics. 'Under them, in the absence of such a plea, no evidence of
insanity can be introduced, 8 no argument on the subject made,8"
and charges on the issue are properly refused.", Except for the
Colorado and the Ohio statutes, they apply only to the defense of
insanity at the time of commission of the offense charged. 8 The
Washington statute further requires in the plea a statement as
to whether or not the defendant is sane at the time of the trial.
A AWritten. plea is required, except in California and Colorado.4
Itis generally to be interposed at the time of arraignment and
plea to the'indictment or information, but may be allowed later
iri th'e- discretion of the court.41 In every state except Colorado,
and 'perhaps Ohio,42 the form is that of a separate plea rather
than a specification under the plea of not guilty. And uniformly,
the plea is not exclusive, it may be interposed with other pleas; 43
moreover; California expressly provides that the plea alone, with-
out an accompanying plea of not guilty, admits the commission
of the act charged.
'i3 ME. REV. STAT. (1916) c. 139, § 1.
3 There have been two as yet unadopted proposals for special pleas of
insanity: in the LOUISiANA PROPOSED CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1910)
arts. 292-298, reprinted in (1913) 3 J. CRrIM. L. 890 at 900; and in the
MISSOURI CRIME SURVEY (1926) 371. The provisions which they contain
are discussed infra.
•5 Walker v. State, 136 Ind. 663, 36 N. E. 356 (1894); Baker v. State,
209 Ala. 142,-95 So. 467 (1923).
.; 6 Walker v. State, 91 Ala. 76, 9 So. 87 (1891). And the special issue
nped not be submitted to the jury. McVey v. State, 169 Wis. 72, 171 N. W.
666 (1919).
37 Matthews v. State, 16 Ala. App. 514, 79 So. 507 (1918).
38 This may be implied from a provision for summary inquisition in the
case of insanity at the time of trial. Cf. ALA. CRIat. CODE (1923) § 4575;
WIs. STAT. (1927) c. 357, § 13.
39 An original plea of sanity at trial waives a later defense of insanity at
trial. State v. Schrader, 135 Wash. 650, 238 Pac. 617 (1925).
4,0 The original Wisconsin statute, Wis. REV. STAT. (1878) § 4697, re-
quired the 'filing" of a plea-now it is merely to be "interposed"; but there
is nothing to indicate that writing is not required.
41 See Knott v. State, 202 Ala. 360, 362, 80 So. 442, 444 (1918). In Wash-
ington it must be made before the issues are submitted to the jury. State
v,,, Wilson, 69 Wash. 235, 124 Pac. 1125 (1912). In Indiana the court is
apparently very liberal in allowing late pleas. See Barber v. State, 197
Ind. 88, 96, 149 N. E. 896, 899 (1925) (on day of trial). A late plea will
often be refused if unaccompanied by affidavits of merit. See Goodman v.
Sta4te, 15 Ala. App. 161, 162, 72 So. 687, 688 (1916).
. 42 The Ohio plea is in the form of a notice to the judge in writing "upon
plea pleaded." A separate plea is indicated.
,3 Its withdrawal does not withdraw other pleas. State v. Quinn, 56
Wash. 295,.105 Pac. 818 (1909).
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A separate trial of the special issue in advance of trial on the
merits was stipulated by the original Wisconsin statute 1 but
the provision has been abandoned. Such trial is discretionary
in Colorado45 California provides for a preliminary trial on the
merits in which the defendant is conclusively presumed to be
sane, and, if the verdict therein is in favor of the prosecution,
for a subsequent separate trial of the insanity issue, in which
the same or a new jury can be used at the discretion of the
court.8  One of the leading purposes of these statutes has been
the separation for the jury of the issues of insanity and the mer-
itsy thus narrowing the possibility of acquittal through sym-
pathy or prejudice. All the states under discussion have
provisions for special verdicts in case of insanity,S but only the
44 Wis. REV. STAT. (1878) §§ 4697, 4699. It was error on the trial of the
special issue, for the jury to consider any question save sanity alone. Hoiss
v. State, 79 Wis. 513, 48 N. W. 517 (1891). The same jury was xequired
for both parts of the trial, but this was subject to waiver by the defendant.
Osborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N. W. 737 (1910). The advance trial
of insanity has been criticized. (1927) 31 LAW NOTES 44.
I* Colo. Laws 1927, c. 90, § 3. The case "in the discretion of the court,
may be either set for trial on the insanity issue alone and the defendant
committed to the ... State Hospital ... or held for trial, dependent on the
verdict of the jury, or be tried on the main case."
46 This provision for two juries may be open to objection in that there
would be an added chance of sympathy verdicts from the possibility of the
larger number of jurors before whom the case might be tried. There might
also be a question of the constitutionality of allowing a separate jury on the
insanity issue, thus making it possible for twenty-four jurors instead of the
jealously guarded number twelve to sit on the trial of the case. Trial by
any number over twelve has been held error. State v. Hudkins, 35 W. Va.
247, 13 S. E. 367 (1891). And apparently no waiver of constitutional
privileges by the defendant can here be implied. But the common-law
special pleas were originally triable by special jury, and now are so in the
court's discretion. See State v. Hudkins, supra at 250, 13 S. E. at 367. It
might be argued that insanity now being a special plea, the same discretion
should be allowed in its trial. The Revisers of the original Wisconsin stat-
ute apparently adopted this reasoning implicitly. See Wis. REV. STAT.
(1898) note to § 4700. But this argument might be weakened by the fact
that the common-law special pleas differ from the plea of insanity in that
they are not only conclusive in themselves, but have always been considered
as quite distinct from the merits. At any rate the provision seems of
relatively little practical importance; a new jury would be only added delay
and expense, and would furthermore seem unnecessary in almost any case if
the separation of issues accomplishes the shortening of trial expected of it.
See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDLME
(Cal. 1927) 16. Even if it be unconstitutional it would not threaten the
constitutionality of the whole section because it is clearly separable from the
main body.
47 See Maxwell v. State, 89 Ala. 150, 165, 7 So. 824, 829 (1889); REPoRrT
OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Cal. 1927)
16; WIS.-REV. STAT. (1898) note to § 4700, containing the Revisers' defense
of their statute.
48 Provisions are found either in the section with the plea stipulation, or
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California, and possibly the Colorado,'9 statutes seem to have
special procedure as well.
The further purpose of notice to the state that the defense will
be raised has been an influential consideration,40 but in the Ameri-
can statutes, except where the defendant must furnish the state
with a list of his witnesses, it is ill accomplished, for he may in-
terpose as many pleas as he will and thus leave the state no
better prepared for his actual defense than would be the case
under a simple inclusive plea of not guilty.
In conclusion, the purpose of notice to the state of the defend-
ant's case seems best fulfilled by a statute such as that of Scot-
land, which covers all defenses that might conceivably surprise
the prosecution, and, by the exchange with the state of the
respective witness lists, prevents the possibility of every defend-
ant pleading all the defenses with no intention of using many of
them. Only in this way, or by the common-law rule against
duplicity of pleading are the issues narrowed so as to save the
state expense in preparing its case. The weakness of the Amer-
ican statutes from the standpoint of notice seems to lie in the
fact that the defendant can plead all the pleas and leave the state
no better informed than if there were no statute. But notice is
necessary chiefly in alibi cases, and as the American statutes are
confined to the defense of insanity, it may not be a major con-
sideration in them. Still, it may be thought advisable to require
a perfunctory notice of other defenses in addition to a detailed
outline of alibi.-
The strict function of special pleading ceases here. But in the
matter of insanity, separation of issues for trial intrudes itself.
If no other manner of dealing with insanity is contemplated, a
provision such as that of the California statute - may be of
value. It may well be that the influence of the jury's sympathy
and prejudice will be felt less when there are separate, distinct
provinces to consider. And it may be that this procedure will
ultimately shorten the time of trials. Yet the true answer to
these questions is in conjecture. And it must be remembered
that the reform contemplated here goes no further than a mere
rearrangement of the order of trial; the same witnesses and the
same evidence will be used; there is no recognition of the real
incapacity of the jury to cope with the question of insanity. The
directly following the plea section, and in IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926)
§ 2292.
4 In Colorado this procedure is discretionary. See supra note 45.
W REPORT OF THE COLMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(Cal. 1927) 16; see Walker v. State, supra note 35, at 668, 36 N. E. at 357.
Notice is explicit in the Ohio statute. Supra note 19.
5
"See Millar, The Reform of Criminal Pleading in Illnois (1917) 8 3.
CaiM. L. 337, 360.
S 52 Supra note 31.
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appointment of expert witnesses by the court, : or the prelimin-
ary psychiatric examination of certain defendants " seem to
come nearer the root of the trouble, and by a more modern
attack.5
WHAT POWERS CAN A SETTLOR RETAIN IN A TRUST WITHOUT
RENDERING IT SUBJECT TO INHERITANCE TAXATION?
The purpose of inheritance tax legislation is to tax the privil-
ege of passing:, or receiving property at death. The transfer
of property during the life of the donor falls outside the pro-
visions of the tax. Thus, within limits prescribed by statute,
gifts inter vivos 2 and trusts created during the life of the
settlor for a valid consideration 3 do not form part of the settlor's
estate for taxation purposes. Where, however, the settlor
creates a trust but retains some interest connected with the trust
property for himself during life, the question arises whether such
trust is properly within the provisions of inheritance tax
statutes.
A settlement may be made whereby the settlor retains either
the income of or the supervision over the trust funds, he may
retain the power of revocation, the power to change beneficiaries,
or to vote shares forming part of the trust fund. In such cases
does the trust become taxable as part of the decedent's estate?
The'statutes governing the matter unfortunately do not define
what powers, if any, the grantor may retain. Under federal 4
and state statutes generally r it is provided that transfers of
property "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after" the death of the settlor shall be taxed. This rough test
53 Cf. Ohio Laws 1927, § 13608. The combination of this provision with
that of a separate trial would seem most effective, although the appointment
is left with a legal and not a medical body.
54 Mass. Acts 1925, c. 169.
, Comment (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 368.
I The taxable interest is "not the interest to which some plerson zucceds
on a death, but the interest which ceases by reason of the death." Holmcz, 3.,
in Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61, 63, 44 Sup. Ct. 293 (1924). Cardrzo,
J. defined the tax as "a charge upon the creation of a right. It is not a
charge upon the fruition in enjoyment or possession." Matter of Schmid-
lapp's Estate, 236 N. Y. 278, 140-N. E. 697, 698 (1923). "The tax is not
laid on the property transferred nor the transfer. The tax has been held
to be on the right to transmit or on the transmission at the beginning."
Coolidge v. Nichols, 4 F. (2d) 112, 115 (D. Blass. 1925).
2The taxability of gifts is treated in Comment (1926) 35 YAM- L. J. 859;
(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 1028.
3 The taxation of trusts for which a valid consideration has been received
is treated in Comment (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 601, 604 et seq.
4 The Federal Estates Tax of 1919, 40 STAT. 1097 (1919), 26 U. S. C. §
1094 (1926).
:Cf. N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAWs (Cahill, 1923) c. 61, § 220 (4); MIASS. GEN.
LAws (1921) c. 65, § 1; IL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 120, § 896.
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has.proved to be inadequate in many respects. The term "take
effegct" as has. been pointed out is "not a phrase of art" El and its
interpretation has led to considerable confusion in the decisions.T
Some consistency may be found in the decisions of the courts,
however, if the terms of the trusts created by the settlors are
analyzed with refernce to their effect upon their taxability. The
retention of certain powers 8 by the settlor has been held not
necessarily to render the trust subject to taxation under the in-
heritance tax statutes.9 By splitting up the concept of property
in the trust into its constituent legal relations, each of them will
be found Ito have been given a certain limited legal significance.
This also raises the question of policy, namely: what particular
property interest or interests in the trust should be taxed, or
conversely, what powers should be retainable by a settlor without
rendering a trust taxable?
It is the view of the majority of courts that where trusts pro-
vide that the net income of the fund shall be payable to the
settlor during his life, the trusts come within the terms of the
typical statutes and are taxable," in spite of the fact that a
"valid" trust is created. It has been urged that this is an ir-
rational treatment of the trust problem, which has been adopted
because the courts have been contented to rely solely upon tax
cases for precedents, and that trusts "if complete and valid" are
not properly subject to an inheritance tax.1' It is difficult to see
6 Frew v. Bowers, 12 F. (2d) 625, 627 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
7 In a case involving the taxation of a trust of almost $20,000,000 Knox,
J. declared: "The matters of general law that are here involved have at-
ready received attention by a number of courts. The results have been far
from uniform, and anything that I may say will not make it so. Until
the Supreme Court speaks, the law is, and will remain, in a state of splen-
did confusion. Therefore I will not undertake to analyse the prior decisions
'k Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 15 F. (2d) 706, 709
(S. D. N. Y. 1926).
8 Such powers as enumerated above.
9 Infra notes 16, 20.
l0,It is significant that, in every reported case of the Court of Appeals
where the gift was taxed, the enjoyment of income was retained by the
donor." Matter of Cochrane, 117 Misc. 18, 29, 190 N. Y. Supp. 895, 002
,(Surr. Ct., 1921), aff'd, 202 App. Div. 751, 194 N. Y. Supp. 924 (2d Dep't
1922); Matter of Green, 153 N. Y. 223,o 47 N. E. 292 (1897); Crocker v,
Shaw, 174 Mass. 266, 54 N. E. 549 (1899) ; McCaughn v. Girard Trust Co.,
11, F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926) ; People v. Northern Trust Co., 330 Ill.
238, 161 N. E. 525 (1928).
,Where only a part of the income is retained by the grantor the tax is
imposed upon a proportionate share of the trust fund. Bradley v. Nichols,
13 F. (2d) 857. (D. Mass. 1926) (tax imposed on half the trust fund, whore
grantor retained half the income); Tips v. Bass, 21 F. (2d) 460 (W. D.
Tex. 1927) (grantor reserved 4nnuity, the corresponding, share of the trust
fund was taxed); State v. Welch's Estate, 235 Mich. 555, 209, N. W. 930
(1926) .semble.
' This.view has been adyanced by, Stimson, When Revocable Tmrsts are
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on grounds of policy why cases involving the question whether
trusts have been validly created so as to cut off claims of curtesy
and dower should govern where a problem of taxation is in-
volved. The mere fact that the courts have classified certain
trusts as "valid" for one purpose should not be controlling. If
trusts of any type are to be subject to inheritance taxation, it
would certainly seem that those which in effect most nearly re-
semble testamentary disposition should be the first to be taxed.
When the settlor retains power over the income of the trust fund,
he enjoys an important property interest, and the courts con-
sistently hold that such an interest is taxable on transfer at
death.
Where the settlor reserves the power of revocation but does
not retain the income from the trust fund there is some conflict
of opinion as to whether the trust is taxable. Under the federal
Estates Tax 13 and some state statutes " it is specifically provided
that such a trust is taxable. The same result has occasionally
been reached by judicial decision independently of such statutory
provision.' The majority of cases hold, however, that the re-
Subject to an Inheritanwe Tax (1927) 25 MIcH. L. Rlv. 839. See also
Notes (1926) 75 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 168; (1925) 74 U. OF P,. L. R1Ev. 176.
The following cases have been cited as authority for the proposition that
a "valid" trust may be created despite the retention of the income during
the life of the settlor and that such trusts should not be taxable. Stone
v. Hackett, 78 Mass. 227 (1858) (trust held valid as against dower claim,
though the grantor retained a life income); Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149,
21 At. 809 (1891) semble; Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91
At. 634 (1914) (as against a curtesy claim 'where the settlor retained a life
income). According to Professor Stimson, op. cit. supra, the courts should
go beyond strictly tax cases for precedents, and the above cases are cited
as illustrations. The courts, however, do not feel obligated to regard the
cestui's interest in the trust as vesting for all purposes on similar facts.
Thus, a cestui was held not to have acquired any enjoyment of a trust fund
for purposes of taxation in Matter of Bostwick, 160 N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208
(1899). The same trust was subsequently, however, held to vest ownership
in the beneficiary for purposes of satisfying the requirements of the rule
against perpetuities. N. Y. Life & Trust Co. v. Cary, 191 N. Y. 3, 83
N. E. 598 (1908).
=Cases cite d svprra note 11.
'340 STAT. 1097 (1919), 26 U. S. C. § 1094 (1926); THURBR, Fl ImL
ESTATE TAx (1921) 52. Under the Bureau regulations of the Federal Tax
Commission, it is provided where the power of revocation is retained "the
entire property transferred should be included in the gross estate . .
:4 Cf. N. Y. ANN. CONs. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 61, § 220 (4).
"V The leading case cited for holding such trusts taxable is Matter of
Bostwick, supra note 11. While citing no cases in support of its stand the
court stressed the argument of policy of preventing evasion of taxation by
some technical transfer. But in this case, as in the cases that followed it,
the settlor retained "dominion" over the trust in addition to the power of
revocation. Cf.- Matter of Hoyt's Estate, 86 Misc. 696, 149 N. Y. Supp. 91
(Surr. Ct. 1914). In New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 205 Mass. 279, 91
N. E. 379 (1910), the court professed to follow the Bostwick case and the
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tention by the settlor of the power of revocation alone will not,
in the absence of express statutory provision, render the trust
subject to taxation as part of the settlor's estate.10 "The power
of revocation," it has been said, "is neither an estate nor prop-
erty and cannot pass at death." 17 It would seem that the tax-
ability of the extinction of a power of revocation in the settlor by
death is a question for the legislature which can provide for the
taxation of trusts where such power is retained, if it is deemed
that this will further the purposes of inheritance taxation.
The retention by the settlor of control over the trust but not
over the income thereof has led to further conflict.18 Where in
cases infra, and held a revocable trust taxable. The following cases some-
times cited for holding a revocable trust taxable all contained the added
factor that the grantor retained an income to himself out of the trust fund:
Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1916); Crocker v.
Shaw, supra note 10; Matter of Green, supra note 10; People v. Kelloy, 218
11. 509, 75 N. E. 1038 (1905) ; Matter of Brandreth, 169 N. Y. 437, 62 N. .
563 (1902); Wrights Appeal, 38 Pa. 507 (1861); Lines' Appeal, 155 Pa.
378, 26 Atl. 728 (1893) ; Matter of Fulham, 96 Vt. 308, 119 Atl. 433 (1923).
Reish v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 521 (1884), does not involve a trust deed,
but a conveyance with a reservation of income by the grantor. In Seibert's
Appeal, 110 Pa. 329, 1 Atl. 346 (1885), the beneficiary of the trust was to
be named in the will of the settler. In Du Bois Appeal, 121 Pa. 368, 15 Atl.
641 (1888), the cestui undertook to settle all claims that might arise
against the grantor in contract or in tort.
In New York there have been a number of decisions which profess to
distinguish the Bostwick case, supra note 11, and hold that the retention
of power of revocation does not render the trust taxable. Matter of Coch-
rane, supra note 10; Matter of Kountze, 120 Misc. 289, 198 N. Y. Supp. 442
(Surr. Ct. 1923). By statute, N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c.
61, § 220 (4), the retention of the power of revocation has been made to
render the trust taxable.
10 "The right to revoke, unexercised, is a dead thing. Its presence in a
deed does not alter the character of the instrument or the estate granted
." In re Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 589, 124 At]. 176, 178 (1924).
This view is supported by Masury's Estate, 28 App. Div. 580, 51 N. Y.
Supp. 331 (2d Dep't 1898), aff'd, 159 N. Y. 532, 53 N. E. 1127 (1899);
People v. Northern Trust Co., 289 111. 475, 124 N. E. 662 (1919); Matter
of Cochrane, supra note 10; Matter of Carnegie, 203 App. Div. 91, 196 N. Y.
Supp. 502 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd 236 N. Y. 517, 142 N. E. 266 (1923);
Matter of Miller's Estate, 236 N. Y. 290, 140 N. E. 701 (1923); Dexter v.
Jackson, 243 Mass. 523, 137 N. E. 877 (1923); of. State Street Trust Co.
v. Friebe, 209 Mass. 373, 95 N. E. 851 (1911) (the taxability of a trust
does not depend on whether power to revoke has or has not been inserted).
'I See In re Dolan's Estate, supra note 16, at 590, 124 Atl. at 179.
1s Under the Federal Estates Tax Regulations of 1919 it was provided
that where the grantor reserved the "power to control the administration
of the trust, as by reserving power to change trustees, the trust period,
the trust property, or the respective interests of the beneficiaries in such
property," the trust was taxable. Subsequently, in 1921, this provision was
omitted from the regulations and the present rule seems to be that only
the power of revocation will render the estate taxable. qiIURnsE, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 52, 393. Of. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 24 F. (2d)
91 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927), cert. granted, 48 Sup. Ct. 436 (1928).
660
COMMENTS
addition to the power of revocation the settlor retains the power
to change the beneficiaries, modify the trust deed, vote shares
forming part of the trust fund, and similar powers, it has been
held that he has such a "dominion" over the trust funds as to
bring it within the spirit of the Estates Tax.1 Some courts, how-
ever, disregard even -these indicia of "possession and enjoyment"
in the settlor and hold such trusts free from inheitance tax-
ation.20
The time set by the settlor for the final dissolution of the trust
is of considerable importance in view of the statutory reference
to "at or after death." There are numerous dicta to this effect
in cases involving trusts where the settlor retained the income
to himself. - Following such dicta a federal district court 22 has
held trusts taxable even where no income is retained by the
settlor, if the date of distribution is "at or after" the death of
the settlor. This view has been questioned in New York.: 3 The
majority of courts go at least so far as to hold that where the
dissolution is contingent on some event other than that of the
settlor's death, the trust is not taxable, even though this event
may not occur until after his death?, The United States Su-
preme Court 25 has recently held a trust not taxable even though
i9 Matter of Bostwick, supra note 11. But of. Matter of Kountze, scpra
note 15 (where the power to revoke, to vote shares, modify the trust, and
withdrawal of trust property was retained, yet no tax was imposed).
20 Matter of Ferris' Estate, 121 Atl. 692 (N. J. 1923) (where only the
value of the voting power of the shares retained by the grantor was taxed).
.1 "The death of the donor was the event which made the transfer com-
plete and effective and secured the nieces the possession and enjoyment of
the property." Matter of Green, smupra note 10, at 228, 47 N. E. at 293. But
this trust also involved the retention of the income by the grantor. "We
see no difference in principle between property passing by deed intended to
take effect in possession and enjoyment on the death of the grantor and
property passing at will. In either case it is the privilege of disposing of
property after the death of the grantor or testator which is taxed . .
Crocker v. Shaw, supra note 10, at 267, 54 N. E. 549 at 550.
22Coolidge v. Nichols, supra note 1 (grantor retained no interest in the
trust which was to be dissolved on death; held taxable). This case Vas
taken to the federal Supreme Court, 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. CL 710 (1927),
but not on the issue here considered. Cf. New England Trust Co. v.
Abbott, supra note 15 (power of revocation reserved).
23 Where income and remainder are out of the grantor, vesting at death,
the death does not affect the disposition of the estate. Matter of Kountze,
supra note 15.
24 Matter of Masury, supra note 16 (where entire fund was to vest on
a specific date, whether the grantor was living or not) ; People v. Northern
Trust Co., supra note 10, semble; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lucas, 7 F. (2d)
146 (W. D. Ky. 1925) semble; People v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 16
(distribution of trust upon the death of the last surviving child of
grantor); Dexter v. Jackson, supra, note 16.
2!5 Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545, 47 Sup. Ct. 461 (1927) (since the
trust, becoming effective in 30 years, was not'Affected "whether he lives or
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the-income from it was to accumulate for the beneficiary until
a date considerably beyond the grantor's expectancy of life. A
dictum in the case 26 indicates that an "immediate and out and
out" transfer took place with the creation of the trust.
In conclusion, it would seem that under the inheritance tax
statutes generally a tax will be imposed upon a trust as part of
the decedent's estate where the settlor retains the income for
himself. There is also a strong tendency, except in a few juris-
dictions, to hold trusts taxable where powers amounting to "ef-
fective dominion!' over the trust are retained by the settlor even
though they do not include the reservation of income. On the
other hand, the majority of courts in the absence of statutory
provision will not impose the tax upon trusts where only the
power of revocation has been retained, whether the income
passes immediately to the cestui or is to accumulate and vest at
some future time, provided, it would seem, that the death of the
grantor is not made the contingency upon which the distribution
of the trust shall take place.
WAIVER OF THE DEFENSES OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND
BREACH OF CONDITIONS IN INSURANCE POLICIES
The "waiver" of a defense created by a statute of limitations
is almost invariably said to "revive" the debt. The recent case
of Potter v. Prudential Life Insurwnce Company I is typical in
this respect. After the term limited for bringing the action had
expired, repeated demands for payment on a life insurance policy
were made during a period of two years. The defendant insur-
ance company at no time expressed an intention to utilize the
statutory defense, but attempted to justify its failure to pay on
the ground that there was insufficient proof of the insured's
death. In an action upon the policy, the insurer's failure to re-
pudiate its duty to pay was held to be tantamount to an ack-
nowledgment of the obligation and a waiver of the defense. The
court said that the insurer's "silence would be evidentiary of the
existence of the debt .... The acknowledgment itself does not
revive the debt, but out of it the law raises or implies a promise
to pay.. . when the condition upon which the acknowledgment
was made has been fulfilled, the law will imply the promise and
revive the debt." 2 Thus the defendant's duty is regarded as
extinguished by operation of the statute, and created anew by an
implied promise.3
dies," the interest of the cestuis was held to vest immediately). See State
v. Welch's Estate, supra note 10, at 566, 209 N. W. at 934 ("Her (grantor's)
death made no difference in the rights of the parties . the trust did
not end with her death").
26 Siukert v. Allen, supra note 25, at 547, 47 Sup. Ct. at 461.
2142 AtI. 891 (Conn. 1928).
2 Ibid. 895.
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Most courts, it seems, explain the waiver similarly, implying
from the acknowledgment a promise to pay, for which the old
obligation is sufficient consideration. 4 The acknowledgment must
not be inconsistent with the fictitious promise, and is insufficient
if accompanied by any expression of an unwillingness to pay.5
Some courts seem to have required a new express promise to
pay.6 The further step of requiring a new consideration for the
waiver has been taken in one case.-
Whether the debt can be regarded as extinguished by the stat-
ute of limitations seems questionable. In a number of situations,
debts have in effect been recognized as existing after the lapse
of the statutory period. Thus, it is generally held that unless
the statute of limitations is specially pleaded, a "barred" claim
may be enforced 8 even though the complaint, on its face, shows
the statutory period to have run.9 When there is a waiver of the
-3 The court found an acknowledgment, although mere failure to deny
responsibility is not usually considered equivalent thereto. Cambridge v.
Holhart, 10 Pick. 232 (Mass. 1831); Connell v. Buchanan, 7 Blackf. 537
(Ind. 1845); Warren v. Perry, 5 Bush. 447 (Ky. 1869); 1 WooD, LnirA-
TioNs (4th ed. 1916) § 73. It is usually said that the acknowledgment must
be "clear, plain, unambiguous." Ibid. § 70; see Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351,
362 (U. S. 1828).
4 See Phillips v. Phillips, 3 Hare 281, 289 (1844) ; Lambert v. Schmalz,
118 Cal. 33, 34, 50 Pac. 13 (1897) ; Bellamy v. Okla. Farm Mtge Co., 278
S. W. 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925); (1925) 4 Tsx. L. REV. 389. "The
courts have by construction, declared that such claim still furnishes a suffi-
cient consideration on which a new agreement may be grounded, binding
the parties...." Belote v. Wynne, 7 Yerg. 534, 543 (Tenn. 1835). Cf. 1
WmuSTON, CONTnACTS (1920) § 161.
5 The case most often cited is Bell v. Morrison, supra note 3, in which
Justice Story said: "If ... a promise is to be raised by implication of
law from the acknowledgment of the party, such acknowledgment ought to
contain an unqualified and direct admission of a previous subsisting debt
which the party is liable and willing to pay." Ibid. 362. See 1 WOOD, op.
cit. supra note 3, §§ 69, 70.
6 Chapman v. Barnes, 93 Ala. 433, 9 So. 589 (1891); George W. Holm
Co. v. Griffin, 112 N. C. 356, 16 S. E. 1023 (1893); Slaughter's Succession,
108 La. 492, 32 So. 379 (1902).
7 Small v. Jones, 138 Ga. 521, 75 S. E. 605 (1912) (express agreement
to waive insufficient); cf. Warren v. Walker, 23 Me. 453 (1844); see Price
v. Seymour, 52 Wis. 272, 275, 9 N. W. 71, 74 (1881) (after holding that
an express promise to pay would "revive" a barred claim, the court doubted
"how any promise not based upon some new consideration could revive and
give life to sucli extinguished debt or obligation").8 Selles v. Pagan, 8 F. (2d) 39 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925) ; Brownrigg v. Free3,
196 Cal. 534, 238 Pac. 714 (1925); Brozell v. Hearn, 33 Ga. App. 600, 127
S. E. 479 (1925); see Conti v. Fisher, 48 R. I. 33, 36, 134 Atl. 849, 350
(1920), where it is said that "when a defendant or respondent makes no
claim to the benefit of the Statute of Frauds, either by pleading or other-
wise, the court sua sponte does not interpose it for him."
9 Shane v. Peoples, 25 N. D. 188, 141 N. W. 737 (1913); Whitworth v.
:Detroit & L. Ry., 81 Mich. 98, 45 N. W. 500 (1890) (judgment on a note
could not be questioned on the ground that the face of the note showed it
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:defense, the original debt is declared upon 10 and considered the
.basis of the cause of action.1 A surety, who may be forced to
pay:a claim "barred" as against his principal 12 may have reim-
bursement.73 A mortgage given as security may be foreclosed
even though the statute, has run against the principal obliga-
,tion.24 A creditor-may have an insurable interest in the life of
his debtor although the latter has the statutory defense,"5 and
when the creditor is owed two debts, one of which is "barred,"
-he may ap'ply a general payment on account to the latter.'"
.Moreover, an accrued statutory defense may be removed by stat-
ute :vithout violating any constitutional guaranty," and a claim
against which the statute has run in the jurisdiction of its crea-
t-ion may be enforced in another jurisdiction having a different
,statutory period.'
From the, foregoing it seems manifest that the running of a
statute of limitations does not ipso facto extinguish the obliga-
:to be outlawed, in absence of special plea); of. Murphy v. Murphy, 71 Cal,
App. 389, 235 Pac. 653 (1925) (holding that it is error for the court to
apply the statute of its own motion). In general, see Atkinson, Pleading
The' Statute of Limitations (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 914.
1O'Kelly v. Leachman, 3 Idaho' 629, 33 Pac. 44 (1893) ; Vinson v. Palmer,
45 Fla. 630, 34 So. 276 (1903) ; Leaper v. Tattan, 16 East 420 (1847) ; of.
1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 196. But some cases hold that suit
must 1e upon the new promise. Rodgers v. Byers, 127 Cal. 528, 60 Pac.
42 (1900) ;.1 WILLISTON, loc. cit supra note 4, at n. 82.
11 Dean v..Hewitt, 5. Wend. 257 (N. Y. 1830); Carshore v. Huyck, 6 Barb.
583 (N. Y. 1849); see Nelson v. Patterson, 229 Ill. 240,, 82 N. E. 229
(1907)'; see Lord Atkinson in Spencer v. Heminerde, [1922] A. C. 507,
524: "I find the great preponderance of the cases is against regarding
the new promise as a new cause of action and it seems to me that reason
also is against it." Cf. cases supra note 9.
u Willis Bros. v. Chewing, 90 Tex. 617, 40 S. W. 395 (1907) ; 1 SPENCER,
SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (1913) § 204.
13 Reid v. Flippin, 47 Ga. 273 (1872); Charbonneau v. Bounet, 98 Tex.
167, 82 S. W. 460 .(1904); 1 SPENCER, op. cit. supra note 12, § 124.14 Smith v. Washington County Ry., 33 Gratt. 242 (Va. 1880); Hulbert
v. Clark, 128 N. 'Y. 295, 28 N. E. 638 (1891); of. Higgins v. Scott, 2
B. & Old. 413 (1831) (lien on goods); see Note (1893) 21 L. R. A. 550;
.2 WOOD, op. cit. supra note 3, § 222.
IS Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Haxton, 129 Ill. App. 626 (1906) ; 1 MAY,
INSURANCE (3d ed. 1891) § 108.
16 Miles v. Foukes, 5 Bing. N. C. 455 (1839); BUSWELL, LIMITATIONS
(1889) § 81.
1, Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. 209 (1885); Robinson
v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 238 N. Y. 271, 144 N. E. 579 (1924).
But there is authority to the contrary in state courts. See (1923) 23
COL. L. REv. 497; Note (1899) 45 L, R. A. 609. And the contrary is
almost universally held -where the statute refers to actions to recover real
property. Attorney General v. Revere Copper Co., 152 Mass. 444, 25
N. E. 605 (1890); see Campbell v,. Holt, supra at 623, 6 Sup. Ct. at 211,
1 8 Pulsifer v. Greene, 96 M6. 438, 52 At]. 92 (1902) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1927) '167.'
' 64
COMMENTS.
tion, 9 i. e., the duty to perform, or the right 20 to its enforcement.
When suit is directly upon the debt or obligation, however, the
statutory defense enables a defendant to extinguish his still-
existing duty by affirmative action, that is, by pleading the stat-
ute. Thus, the running of the statute merely adds a new power-
liability 2 1 -relation.
It appears that a power may be waived without consideration.
Thus a power of appointment in real property law may be so
"released" (or waived) 22 A joinder with remaindermen in a
bill asking for a sale of the lands for partition has been held
sufficient for that purpose.23 Similarly, the power to terminate
a landlord-tenant relation,2- and the powers created in a surety
by the creditor's extension of time to the principal; 2 in a debtor
19 See Hulbert v. Clark, supra note 14, at 297, 28 N. E. at 638, where
it is said that "The debt and the obligation to pay the same remain, and
the arbitrary bar of the statute alone stands in the way of the creditor
seeking to compel payment." See 1 WooD, op. cit. supra note 3, § 63a, n. 1,
citing a number of cases as holding that only the remedy is barred.
As additional support for this proposition, it may be noted that a
waiver starts a new period of limitations which is measured by the nature
of the original obligation. Bayliss v. Street, 51 Idaho 627, 2 N. W. 437
(1879); 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 185. Also a waiver does
not create a new contract within the rule that the statute does not run
on contracts between husband and wife made during coverture. Enwright
v. Griffith, 169 Wis. 284, 172 N. W. 156 (1919).
20 The term "right" is used as the correlative of duty and to signify
"an enforceable claim to performance (action or forbearance) by another."
Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology (1919) 29 Y.AL L. J. 163, 167.
See HOHFm, FUNDAmENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTioNS (1923) 6, 36.
21 A power is "the legal relation of A to B when A's own voluntary act
will cause new legal relations either between B and A or between B and a
third person." Corbin, op. cit. supra note 20, at 168. The legal relation of B
under such circumstances is a liability. When the power given by the
statute of limitations is used, the plaintiff's liability is extinguished and a
new immunity-disability relation is thereby created.
= Hancock-Malcom v. Burford-Hancock, 74 L. T. R. (N. S.) 65S (1896);
44 & 45 Vir. c. 41, § 52 (1881) (permitting powers simply collateral
to be released by deed); Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R. I. 549, 10 Atl. 5S9
(1887) (to A for life with power of appointment and in default of appoint-
ment to A's heirs at law. A and the heirs were held capable of conveying
a fee in the property, the power having been released by the conveyance).
23 Thornington v. Thornington, 82 Ala. 489 (18S6).
24 See Dendy v. Michall, 4 C. B. (N. s. ) 376, 387 (1858) (bringing action
for rent accruing after breach of condition held conclusive of an inten-
tion to treat the relation as still subsisting); 2 TIFFANY, LA=Lnow AND
TENANT (1912) 1389-1390; cf. Cleve v. Mazzoni, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 200, 45
S. W. 88 (1898) (acceptance of rent after action brought to enforce
termination of the relation was not a waiver).
25 Bramble v. Ward, 40 Ohio St. 267 (1883) ; Fowler v. Brooks, 13 N. H.
240 (1842) (implied promise to pay sufficient); SPENCEE, op. cit. Clpra
.note 12, § 231 (recognizing that the promise is a waiver of a defense
and not the-making of a new obligation).
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by bankruptcy proceedings; 26 and in one who contracted while
under the disability of infancy 27-- all being powers to extinguish
a still-existing duty may be waived without any consideration.
According to this analysis, the duty or debt in the instant
case was not revived; instead this newly created and outstanding
power of the defendant, by the exercise of which he could have
extinguished his duty, was waived, the insurer's silence under
repeated requests for payment being considered sufficient evi-
dence of a waiver.28
It has been urged that the doctrine of waiver is an insufficient
explanation of this result because the new promise, express or
implied, is the measure of the plaintiff's right; in other words,
the defendant can make the effect of his promise or acknowledg-
ment dependent upon conditions which he may specify at the
time.29 But as the courts recognize an unconditional waiver of
the power, there is no reason for their refusing to recognize one
which is conditional, 30 especially in view of the fact that some
courts recognize a waiver as to only a portion of the amount
claimed.32 In several cases, furthermore, a condition has been
disregarded after a clear acknowledgment of the debt's existence
had been found.32 Many courts hold that an unconditional ack-
nowledgment coupled with an offer of compromise will constitute
a waiver to the entire claim.33 Another objection sometimes
26 Brooks v. Paine, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1125, 77 S. W. 190 (1903); Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Lyman, 90 Minn. 275, 96 N. W. 87 (1903).
27 Cohel v. Baer, 134 Ind. 375, 32 N. E. 920 (1893); Edgerly v. Shaw,
25 N. H. 514 (1852); 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 154.2 8 Arnold, The Statute of Limitations In The Law of Suretyship (1922)
17 ILL. L. Rav. 1, 10: "Whether the words and acts of the defendant (the
evidence of an alleged acknowledgment or promise) constitute a waiver is a
question of construction for the court; that the debtor did not intend to
release his statutory defense seems to be immaterial." See Spencer v.
Hemmerde, supra note 11, at 525-526.
29 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 204.
30 As, for instance, a power created by a discharge in bankruptcy. Cf.
International Harvester Co. v. Lyman, supra note 26.
31Hannah v. Hawkins, 5 Lea. 240 (Tenn. 1880) (an offer to pay the
balance on a note payable in specie, without any offer of deduction on
account of prior payments in currency, held'to waive the defense to the
extent of the offer); Graham v. Kigs, 29 Pa. 189 (1857) (an unaccepted
offer to pay the principal of a claim without interest precluded the statutory
defence as to the principal only); of. Edgerly v. Shaw, supra note 27
(similarly as to the power arising from disability of infancy).32 Western Casket Co. v. Estrada, 116 S. W. 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909)
("I can take care of your account in monthly installments.... (This is]
the only bill I owe in the world."); Strong v. Andras, 34 App. D. C. 278
(1910); see Foster v. Smith, 52 Conn. 449, 451 (1885).
SPratt v. McNell, 40 Kan. 1, 18 Pac. 925 (1888). (an offer to exchange
another note for one held against defendant)' Marcum v. Terry, 146 Ky.
145, 142 S.-W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 885 (1912) (offer to exchange
a tax receipt held against plaintiffs land in satisfaction); Teasley ,v.
Bradley, 110 Ga. 497, 35 S. E. 782 (1910). *
COMMENTS
urged is that the defense of the statute of limitations to an action
based on tort cannot be waived.3- But since the duty to pay for
the tort was assumed to have been extinguished by the running
of the statutory period, and since at common law a promise to
pay for a tort would not sustain an assumpsit action, it was not
surprising that the courts denied effect to a new promise to pay.3
This rule today is purely arbitrary, and appears to have little
justification in policy.
A striking application of the suggested analysis may be found
in the field of insurance. A policy often provides that the breach
of a specified condition or conditions shall completely annul the
contract.2 6 Courts refuse to hold that a breach of such condition
ipso facto terminates the right-duty relation2 7 Instead, the
breach is held to create in the insurer a power to extinguish its
duty either by express repudiation before action brought 3 or by
affirmative plea afterwards.39 Accordingly, this power may be
waived without consideration or elements of an estoppel; 4' the
insurer's intention to do so is said to be controlling.41 Hence,
slight circumstances are often seized upon to declare a waiverW2
Thus a request for proofs of loss; 3 silence after notice of
31Nelson v. Petterson, 229 Ill. 240, 82 N. E. 229 (1907); Peterson v.
Breitage, 88 Iowa 418, 55 N. W. 86 (1893); Note (1908) 13 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 912.
35 Hurst v. Parker, 1 B. & Old. 92 (1817); 1 WmLiSTON op. cit. cupza
note 4, § 186. Cf. Goodwyn v. Goodwyn, 16 Ga. 114 (1854); Qothout v.
Thompson, 20 Johns. 277 (N. Y. 1829).
36 See cases cited infra notes 37-46.
7 Ville v. Germania Ins. Co., 26 Iowa 9 (1868); Southern Nat. In-. Co.
v. Barr, 148 S. W. 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
3s Security Ins. Co. v. Cook, 99 Okla. 275, 227 Pac. 402 (1924); Clouer
v. Banker's Life Co., 117 Kan. 683, 232 Pac. 1068 (1925).
39 This is the general rule. Moody v. Ins. Co., 52 Ohio St. 12, 38 N. E.
1011 (1894); Austin v. Prudential Health & Accident Ins. Co., 124 Me.
232, 127 Atl. 276 (1925).
-
0 Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 219 S. W. 254 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920); Kerr v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 124 Okla. 112, 254 Pac.
105 (1926) ; State Life Ins. Co. v. Finney, 216 Ala. 562, 114 So. 132 (1927).
41 Bowman v. Surety Fund Life Ins. Co., 119 Minn. 118, 182 N. W. 991
(1921); Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Pitcher, 160 Ind. 392, 64 N. E. 921
(1902); Note (1902) 16 HARV. L. REV. 217; see Kerr v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 124 0ka. 112, 254 Pac. 105, 109 (1926) ; Kennedy v. Maury,
6 Ga. App. 816, 819, 66 S. E. 29, 31 (1900) ("waiver depends upon what
one himself intends to do ... "). Of course the defendant's acts determine
his intention for this purpose. Therefore, defendant's acts may constitute a
waiver even though he declares, at the time, that he does not intend to
waive any defenses. DeFrancesco v. Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 162, 134 At].
789 (1926).
42The attitude of the particular court toward these conditions will largely
determine what circumstances will be sufficient. Cf. Royal Ins. Co. v.
Drury, 150 Md. 211, 132 Atl. 635 (1926); Arnold v. American Ins. Co.,
148 Cal. 660, 84 Pac. 182 (1906).43 Bowman v. Surety Fund Life Ins. Co., supra note 41; of. Royal Ins.
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,breach; 4 an unaccepted offer to receive part payment of an
overdue premium; 45 and a demand of payment of a note given
for an overdue premium 46 have been held sufficient.
It has been said that "such decisions lose sight of the fact that
this is a case of subjecting the insurer to a new liability with no
compensating advantage." 4T Frequent dicta of an earlier date
are in accord 48 and therefore argue that a waiver must be based
upon consideration or elements of an estoppel. 5 But it is be-
lieved that there are practically no cases so holding,o and, since
conditions in insurance policies are often merely studied defenses
having no substantial foundation in justice,5 ' that such a view
has no justification on the ground of policy.
RIGHT OF CREDITOR TO APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER FOR DEBTOR
CORPORATION
In the recent case of Delaney Co. v. Crystal Products Co.,, a
creditor sought the appointment of a receiver for a corporation
alleged to be in an insolvent condition. The action was predicated
on the statutory provision 2 that, "a receiver may be appointed
when a corporation is in imminent danger of insolvency."
The court held that this provision did not authorize the appoint-
ment of a receiver for a creditor who had not reduced his claim
to judgment.3
Co. v. Drury, supra note 42 (request for an estimate as to replacement
cost, and for names of prior owners of the property).44 Kely v. Peoples Nat. Fire Ins.. Co., 262 Ill. 168, 104 N. E. 188 (1914).
45 Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, supra note 40.
46Washburn v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ala. 485, 38 So. 1011
(1905).
472 WMLISTON, op cit. supra note 4, § 764; of. Corbin, Conditions in the
Law of Contracts (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 754, 755, where it is said that
"where the waiver consists of a mere voluntary assent there is no con-
sideration of any sort, and yet a new duty is thereby created where no
such duty previously existed."
4 3Smith v. Saratoga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 3 Hill 508, 511 (N. Y. 1842);
Ins. Co. v. Lacroix, 45 Tex. 158, 168 (1876); cf. Duval v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 82 N. H. 543, 546, 136 Atl. 400, 403 (1927).
49Ins. Co. v. Wolff, 95 U. S. 326 (1877); Kennedy v. Grand Fraternity,
36 Mont. 325, 92 Pac. 971 (1907); Gibson Electric Co. v. Liverpool &
London Globe Ins. Co., 159 N. Y. 418, 54 N. E. 23 (1899); Joye v.
South Carolina Mutual Ins. Co., 54 S. C. 375, 32 S. E. 446 (1899).
5o The facts in cases which seem to require a consideration or estoppel,
will often be found to involve a substituted agreement. For instance, in
Lantz v. Vermont Mutual Life Ins. Co., 139 Pa. 546, 21 Atl. 80 (1891),
the parties agreed to extend the period for payment of premium notes
and therefore the strong language of the court, as applied to the facts,
was correct.
51 See Royal Ins. Co. v. Drury, supra note 42.
1264 Pac. 521 (Cal. 1928).
2 CAL. CODES OF CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1923) § 564 (5).
3 The court also refused to sustain the contention that the assets of a
corporation constitute a "trust fund" for a creditor.
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The appointment of a receiver is part of what has been desig-
nated at times as a "creditor's bill." ' The purpose of the bill
is to obtain satisfaction of the creditor's claim by resorting to
assets attainable only through the power of equity. Such cor-
porate interests as choses in action,5 power to exercise an option
to purchase,6 and rights of redemption7 have been reached in
this manner. Must the petitioning creditor first have attained
a judgment at law to receive such equitable relief? The United
States Supreme Court has answered in the affirmative on the
ground that the debtor corporation is entitled to a jury trial
to determine the issue of debts Its decision has been followed
generally in the federal courts, but not without dissent." When
a judgment would appear useless or unobtainable, ° or seems
4 Such appointment is ancillary to a main suit, which must be pending.
It cannot be the sole desideratum. Price v. Bankers' Trust Co., 178 S. W.
745 (Mo. 1915); 1 SAirrH, REc ivRs (Tardy's ed. 1920) 50.
5 Hincke Printing Co. v. Bailey, 263 Pac. 719 (Colo. 1923); Homan v.
Fir Products Co., 123 Wash. 260, 212 Pac. 240 (1923).
6 Eastern Bridge Co. v. Worcester Auditorium Co., 216 Mlass. 426, 103
N. E. 913 (1914) (debtor's interest in a lease containing an option to
purchase held a right to property, reached by a statutory creditor's bill).
7 Ball v. Peper Cotton Press Co., 141 Mo. App. 26, 121 S. W. 793 (1909)
(right of redemption of pledgor); Gilcreast v. Bartlett, 74 N. H. 29, 64
Atl. 767 (1906) (right of redemption of mortgagor). For an extensive
note on the interests that may be reached by a creditor's bill, see ANN.
CAs. 1914B 946. It is often broadly stated that any interest which can-
not be seized under the process of execution in the particular jurisdiction
is subject to a creditor's bill. SLUM, op. cit. mipra note 4, § 277.
s Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106, 11 Sup. Ct. 712 (1890) ; Cates v. Allen,
149 U. S. 451, 13 Sup. Ct. 977 (1892). The latter decision refused to
recognize a statute of Mississippi, which did away with the necezzity for
a judgment. The right to jury trial and the distinction between law and
equity in the federal courts were assigned as reasons. See 16 RosE, NOMn
538. For a similar point of view, that to give a creditor the equitable
remedy before obtaining a judgment would lead to "unnecesary and per-
haps fruitless and oppressive interruption to the exercise of the debtor's
rights," see Tennent v. Battey, 18 Ran. 324, 327 (1877); Farmers' State
Bank v. Lemley, 105 Kan. 15, 180 Pac. 238 (1919).
9 Canton Roll & Machine Co. v. Rolling Mill Co., 155 Fed. 321 (C. C.
N. D. W. Va. 1907); Viquesney v. Allen, 131 Fed. 21 (C. C. A. 4th,
1904); and Davidson-Wesson Co. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 141 Fed. 37
(C. C. A. 5th, 1905), follow Cates v. Allen, mprca note 3. This holding
was departed from in Darragh v. Wetter Mfg. Co., 78 Fed. 7 (C. C. A.
8th, 1897), where a simple contract creditor had a receiver appointed as
provided for under the Arkansas statute. This decision was followed in
Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., 123 Fed. 506 (C. C. D. Del. 1903), holding
that to require a judgment at law is inconsistent with the equitable right
created by the Delaware statute. Cf. Ky. Wagon Co. v. Jones & Hopkins
Co., 248 Fed. 272 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918) (creditor with a trust in his favor
does not need a judgment).
10 Nunnally v. Strause, 94 Va. 255, 26 S. E. 580 (1897) (debtor cor-
poration insolvent and abandoned); Lion Bonding Co. v. Karatz, 230 Fed.
532 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) (corporation property in imminent danger of
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otherwise injudicious,1 the courts do not require prior adjudica-
tion of the creditor's claim. By a mere failure to interpose an
answer to the creditor's bill the corporation is deemed to waive
any necessity for the existence of a judgment. 2 Likewise, when
the creditor has a trust fund or other lien in his favor even
the federal courts will grant a receivership, other facts warrant-
ing such action.13  The problem is worked out in some states
through the code cause of action in which the relief sought by
the creditor's bill is obtained after the merits of the creditor's
claim have been decided.' 4 In a few states, the statutes expressly
exclude the need of an existing judgment at law." But when
the statute merely enumerates the grounds for appointing a re-
ceiver, as in the California statute, without discussing the quali-
fication of the complainant,"6 judicial interpretation differs.
Some courts, as illustrated in the instant case, have interpolated
the rule used before the statute and insist on the existence of
dissipation); Albany Steel Co. v. So. Agricultural Works, 76 Ga. 135
(1886) (insolvent scheme to defraud creditor); Shuck v. Quackenbush,
75 Colo. 592, 227 Pac. 1041 (1924) (debtor a fugitive from justice); United
States v. Pann, 23 F. (2d) 714 (S. D. Cal. 1927) (corporate property
fraudulently distributed to shareholders).
1 1 Re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U. S. 901, 28 Sup. Ct. 219
(1908) (receiver appointed when a refusal would cause inconvenience to
those using the defendant's road in New York City); Weiss v. Haight
Co., 148 Fed. 399 (C. C. D. Mass. 1906) (debtor running a bucket shop).
12 Cassels Mills v. First Nat. Bank, 187 Ala. 325, 65 So. 820 (1914);
Northwestern Bank v. Mickelson-Shapiro Co., 134 Minn. 422, 159 N. W.
948 (1916); 3 COOK, CORPORATIONS (6th ed. 1908) § 863. In American
Can Co. v. Erie Preserving Co., 171 Fed. 540, 541 (C. C. W. D. N. Y. 1909),
the court said, "where a defendant has waived the objection that a com-
plainant is not a judgment creditor there is no longer room for doubting
the jurisdiction of a federal court of equity to appoint a receiver."
23 Ky. Wagon Co. v. Jones Mfg. Co., supra note 9 (creditor *with a trust
fund); Warren v. Kilgroe, 176 Ala. 476, 58 So. 432 (1912) (assets of
insolvent corporation declared by statute to be a trust fund for creditors);
United States v. Pann, supra note 10 (property of a corporation distributed
to shareholders is trust fund for creditors).
14 Huntington v. Jones, 72 Conn. 45, 43 Atl. 564 (1899); Armstrong
Grocery Co. v. Banks, 185 N. C. 149, 116 S. E. 173 (1923). Early New
York cases are contra: Crippen v. Hudson, 13 N. Y. 161 (1855) ("the
union of legal and equitable jurisdiction in the supreme court does not
furnish any reason for departing from the well established rule");
Beardsley Scythe Co. v. Foster, 36 N. Y. 560 (1867).
5 Summit Silk Co. v. Kinston Spinning Co., 154 N. C. 431, 70 S. H.
820 (1911); N. C. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1919) § 1208; Coombs v. Watson,
32 Ohio St. 228 (1877); OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 11894; Dillard
Co. v. Smith, 105 Tenn. 372, 59 S. W. 1010 (1900); TENN. ANN. CODE
(Shannon, 1917) § 6100.
'1 Such statutes merely provide that a receiver may be appointed when-
ever a corporation ii insolvent.
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a judgment at law,17 but a majority of the courts have held
that such statutory provision abrogates the requirement.'-
Assuming that a creditor has a judgment or that the case
is one where it is not needed, what type of facts must exist to
entitle the creditor to have a receiver appointed? In the absence
of statutory provision, insolvency alone is not sufficient.'0 But
it would be unlikely that the only allegation in the plaintiff's
complaint would be the insolvency of the debtor corporation. So,
when the insolvent corporation is also charged with fraud,2' or
is seeking illegally to divert corporate assets from creditors; 2
or it is shown in other ways that a receiver is necessary to
conserve the corporate assets, a receiver will be appointed.2-
Solvency per se does not bar the right to a receiver, but in such
cases strong and convincing evidence is required to show that
a receiver is necessary to protect corporate creditorsY2 At pres-
ent, the grounds which warrant the appointment of a corpora-
tion receiver at the instance of creditors are often expressly
enumerated by statute.2 4  The following provision is frequently
-"7In addition to the instant case see Cook v. Leona Mills Lumber Co.,
106 Ore. 520, 212 Pac. 785 (1923).
Is Abilene Tel. Co. v. S. W. Tel. Co., 185 S. W. 356 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916); Jones v. Page, 26 N. M. 440, 194 Pac. 883 (1920); Portage Brick
Co. v. No. Brick Co., 189 Ind. 639, 128 N. E. 847 (1920) ; Jones v. Mutual
Fidelity Co., supra note 9 (Delaware statute, similar to that of California,
interpreted as inconsistent with the contention that a judgment at law
is necessary).
T Armour Fertilizer Works v. First Nat. Bank, 87 Fla. 436, 100 So. 362
(1924); Forsell v. Pittsburg & Montana Copper Co., 42 Mlont. 412, 113
Pac. 479 (1911); HIGH, RECEIMVS (4th ed. 1876) § 18; 2 JoNes, II soLvEN
CORPORATiomS (1908) 1487. For cases under the statutes, see infra note
26.
20 Carpenter v. Landman, 192 Mlich. 544, 159 N. W. 322 (1916) ; Barnard
Mfg. Co. v. Ralston Co., 71 Wash. 659, 129 Pac. 389 (1913).21 Dalsheimer v. Graphic Arms Co., 86 N. J. Eq. 49, 97 Atl. 497 (1916)
(corporation was attempting to transfer its stock to a Delaware corpora-
tion to effect a change in situs).22 Provident Relief Ass'n v. Vernon, 19 F. (2d) 709 (Ct. of App. D. C.
1927) (insurance company was wilfully mismanaged; protracted litigation
exdsted between shareholders); United States Shipbuilding Co. v. Conklin,
126 Fed. 132 (C. C. A. 3d, 1903) (gross mismanagement and breach of
trust by directors) ; 1 SAirrH, op. Cit. smpra note 4, at 731.23 Adams v. Farmers' Nat. Bank, 167 Ky. 506, 180 S. W. 807 (1915)
(gross mismanagement and fraud of directors); Schipper Bros. Coal Min-
ing Co. v. Economy Coal Co., 277 Pa. 356, 121 Atl. 193 (1923) (disagree-
ment between two shareholders, owning all shares, causing the business
to be run at a loss); Lieberman v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 18, 236
Pac. 570 (1925) (fraud of corporate directors, sequestration of past profits,
deterioration in oil well by failure to use). But cf. Carzon v. Allegany
Window Glass Co., 189 Fed. 791 (C. C. D. Del. 1911) (irregularities and
mismanagement involving no fraud or wilful neglect of duty not sufficient
to warrant a receivership).24
-The California statute is typical. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 102.3)
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found: "in all other cases where a receiver has been appointed
by a court of equity." 2 The statutes codified the usual grounds
for the appointment of a receiver and added others.2 0 Inasmuch
as receivership is considered a stringent remedy, depriving the
directors of control and upsetting the corporate structure, the
courts have committed theniselves to strict rules of pleading and
proof.2 7
§ 564: "A receiver may be appointed by the court in which an action is
pending.
(1) In an action by a vendor to vacate a fraudulent purchase of prop-
erty, or by a creditor toi subject any property or fund to his claim....
(2) In an action by a mortgagee for the foreclosure of his mortgage
and sale of the mortgaged property, where it appears that the mortgaged
property is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured....
(5) In tho cases where a corporation has been dissolved or is insolvent,
or is in imminent danger of insolvency, or has forfeited its corporate
rights....
(7) In all other cases where receivers have heretofore been appointed
by the usages of courts of equity."
To the same effect, see IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 1300; CONN.
GEN. STAT. (1918) § 3443; N. Y. CONS. LAws ANN. (2d ed. 1917) c. 23,'
§ 306; DEL. REV. CODE (1915) § 3883.
25 See supra note 24. But even without such a provision, the courts do
not interpret the statuto.sy provisions as *exclusive. Northwestern Bank
v. Michelson-Shapiro Co., supra note 12; see Merrifield v. Burrows, 153
Ill. App. 523, 525 (1910).
26 Cronan v. District Court, 15 Idaho 184, 96 Pac. 768 (1908) (insolvency
alone sufficient ground); Jones v. Page, supra note 18, semble; Ala. Ry.
v. Tolman, 200 Ala. 499, 76 So. 381 (1917) (assets of insolvent corpora-
tion are trust fund for creditors. But cf. Hobson v. Pac. States Mer-
cantile Co., 5 Cal. App. 94, 89 Pac. 866 (1907) (although insolvency alone
is ground for appointing a receiver, the appointment must be ancillary
to a main suit, according to the established equity rule) ; Price v. Bankers'
Trust Co., supra note 4, semble.
Under the Delaware statute, DEL. REv. CODE (1915) § 3883, insolvency
alone is sufficient ground for the appointment of a receiver. Adler v.
Campeche Laguna Corp., 257 Fed. 789 (D. Del. 1919). But the statute
excepts cases of corporations for public improvement. Thoroughgood v.
Georgetown Water Co., 9 Del. Ch. 84, 77 Atl. 720 (1910). Judicial inter-
pretation has been strict. In Whitmer v. Whitmer & Sons, 11 Del. Ch.
222, 99 Atl. 428 (1916), a receiver was denied where the facts of insolvency
were disputed, and in Jones v. Maxwell Motor Co., 13 Del, Ch. 76, 115
Atl. 312 (1921), although all the jurisdictional facts were sufficient, it
was held within the discretion of the chancellor to refuse to appoint a
receiver.
27A general allegation of fraud is insufficient. Smith v. Birmingham
Disinfectant Co., 174 Ala. 374, 56 So. 721 (1911); Sunshine Consolidated
Oil Co. v. Prechel, 268 S. W. 1051, 1053 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) ("while
the petition contains a conclusion that the corporation is insolvent, no
sufficient facts are alleged to show such insolvency. . . . While certain
indebtedness of the corporation is alleged, there is no allegation as to
the value of its assets."); Bijur v. Bijur Motor Appliance Co., 121 At].
6 (N. J. Eq. 1923); HIGH, op. cit. supra note 19, at 186.
